Morality

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U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart famously argued that he did not need to provide a formal definition of what counts as “hard-core pornography,” because, “I know it when I see it.” People (including scholars) seem to have the same sense about morality: They simply know what morality is, often without being able to concretely define what it means, exactly, to label something as a moral kind. Some aspects of morality are seemingly universal and necessary for social functioning. People feel they have the right to tend to their own welfare in socially acceptable ways, and at the same time a duty to fulfil their social obligations (Berkowitz, 1972), to reciprocate kindnesses and favors (Gouldner, 1960), to support their ingroups (Sober & Wilson, 1998), and to refrain from needlessly harming others (Turiel, 2002). People in all cultures seem to endorse some version of the Golden Rule (Hauser, 2006), even if people individually or within cultures might prioritize some beliefs, rules, and values differently (e.g., Buchtel et al., 2015; Vasquez, Keltner, Ebenbach, & Banazynski, 2001). It is when one tries to more precisely and scientifically define what morality is, however, that things become much less clear. Our goal with this chapter is to try to map how psychologists have tried to grapple with the challenge of studying what turns out to be a surprisingly fuzzy construct: Morality.

The study of morality has historically been the special province of philosophy and moral development. Social psychological interest in the topic intensified around the turn of the millennium. To provide a sense of the field and developments in it over time, we first provide a review the lessons learned from theory and research in moral development from approximately 1930-2000. We then review major developments in social psychological approaches to questions of morality from 2000 to the present. As the reader will soon learn, the field is animated by questions about the relative roles of reason and emotion in moral phenomena, often takes its lead
from moral philosophy (sometimes blurring the lines between normative and descriptive claims), and is characterized more by competing theories and perspectives than by theoretical or scientific consensus.

Moral Psychology ~1930 – 2000

Moral psychology from approximately 1930 until 2000 was primarily studied from a developmental perspective. The focus was largely on character development, something people were deeply concerned about as society became increasingly secularized. This period of theory and research focused primarily on how people make moral judgments and on moral reasoning, particularly in response to various moral dilemmas that required people to grapple with difficult choices between competing values (e.g., do not harm, maximize the collective good). Because of its focus on character and character education, this period of theory and research tended to have a prescriptive spin, by implicitly or explicitly positing that some kinds of moral reasoning are superior to others.

Probably the earliest scientific study of moral psychology was Jean Piaget’s focus on the moral lives of children as revealed through games and play. Piaget (1932/1997) observed that children’s games tended to be dominated by concerns about fairness. Young children focus on rigidly following rules imposed by outside authorities, but eventually most children learn that fair rules can be negotiated by taking others’ perspectives into account. Over time, coordinating play becomes more important than the rules themselves. From these observations, Piaget described moral development as arising through interpersonal interactions whereby people find solutions that everyone will accept as fair.

Kohlberg (1969) embraced Piaget’s conclusion that morality centers around fairness and justice and elaborated his developmental model into six stages (a theoretical approach that would
dominate psychological discourse about morality for several decades). At Stages 1 and 2, people’s conception of justice is defined primarily by self-interest: they do little more than try to minimize punishments and maximize rewards. At Stages 3 and 4, people begin to consider others’ expectations for their behavior, and the implications of their behavior for group functioning. They show concern for other’s feelings, strive to appear as good people, and feel obligated to contribute to larger groups (e.g., their school or society). At Stage 5, people define justice in terms of basic human rights and values. People at this stage conceptualize life as a social contract where they agree to abide by rules that foster the common good by protecting individuals and society, and challenge rules that do not (such as slavery). Finally, at Stage 6, people believe that rules, laws, and other social agreements are valid only if they are based on universal ethical principles derived from logic; someone at this stage, for example, might object to abortion even though it is legally allowed. People at Stage 6 are motivated to personally live up to such standards regardless of social approbation.

Kohlberg and his colleagues and students generally studied the stages of moral reasoning by analyzing the justifications people provided for their responses to moral dilemmas to glean whether their moral reasoning was more consistent with one another stage of moral development. One of the classic examples of the dilemmas used in this research was the Heinz dilemma (Kohlberg, 1981):

A woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging 10X what the drug cost him to make. He paid $400 for the radium, and charged $4K for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman’s husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money and tried every legal means, but could only get $2K, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay

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1 The reasons people provide for their moral judgments determine their stage, not the content of their moral judgment (i.e., their specific position on something like abortion is irrelevant).
later. But the druggist said, “No, I discovered the drug and I’m going to make money from it.” So, having tried every legal means, Heinz gets desperate and considers breaking into the store to steal the drug for his wife.

Should Heinz still the drug? Why or why not?

Although Kohlberg’s theory was very generative and influential, overtime research revealed serious limitations. Most problematic, people seldom give responses that fall neatly into any single Kohlbergian stage; evidence for stage regression abounds (e.g., Simpson, 1974; Sullivan, 1977). In addition to this core problem, critics increasingly accused the theory of cultural insensitivity and championing a Western worldview (e.g., Simpson, 1974; Sullivan, 1977), and for sexism in its construction and interpretation of morality because it does not make any reference to an ethic of care, a moral principle traditionally ascribed more to women than men (Gilligan, 1982). Perhaps most importantly, the theory at its heart is more normative than descriptive—that is, it prescribes what kind of moral reasoning is more “mature” or one should aspire to achieve (e.g., Stage 5 or 6), without any scientific basis for establishing what makes for better or worse forms of moral reasoning.

More contemporary versions of the theory have adapted some components of Kohlberg’s ideas, and some of his methodological choices. A considerable amount of modern moral psychology continues to rely on people’s reactions to hypothetical dilemmas that pit one moral concern against another (e.g., whether to steal to save a life, or whether to sacrifice one to save several others) to gain insight into how people morally juggle competing concerns. More contemporary theories in both moral development and social psychology, however, have dropped the most controversial aspects of Kohlberg’s theorizing, including the notion of ordered developmental stages and the idea that some ways of thinking about morality are normatively better or more mature than others. We briefly review two neo-Kohlbergian moral theories (moral
schema theory and domain theory) before turning to the renaissance of interest in morality that began to emerge in social psychology at the turn of the millennium.

Moral schema theory. Moral schema theory recast the Kolhberg’s stages of moral reasoning as three cognitive schemas instead (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999). According to this theoretical update, socio-moral judgments arise from three kinds of schemas: 1) personal interests (much like Kohlberg’s Stages 1 and 2), 2) norm maintenance (much like Kolberg’s Stages 3 and 4), and 3) post-conventional (much like Kohlberg’s Stages 5 and 6). Rest et al. theorized that, once formed in childhood and early development, people may use any of these schemas to guide judgments and behavior, and move fluidly between them depending on how features of situations and social relationships activate or map onto one or another. Yet, Rest et al. continued to emphasize rationality and justice: “We still agree with Kolhberg that the aim of the developmental analysis of moral judgment is the rational reconstruction of the ontogenesis of justice operations” (Rest et al., 1999, p. 56, emphasis added).

Moral domain theory. As criticism of Kolhberg’s theory continued to mount, domain theory also emerged as a reformulation and extension. Domain theory grew out of the key empirical observation that people—including very young children—differentiate actions that harm innocent people from actions that break rules but harm no one (e.g., Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1981; Turiel, 1983). This observation led domain theorists to surmise that two distinct systems underlie people’s judgments of social events: a system focused on morality, and another system focused on social convention.

The moral domain is defined as people’s conceptions of rights, fairness, and human welfare that depend on inherent features of actions (Turiel, 1983). From the domain theory perspective, harming someone for no reason is wrong because it hurts them—not because doing
so violates a law, rule, or custom (i.e., the act itself is wrong). Social conventions, in contrast, are rules that a particular group has developed to create and maintain order and cooperation within the group. Unlike moral standards, conventional standards are arbitrary in the sense that they depend on group norms and practices rather than the actions they govern. Greeting someone by shaking hands rather than raising your middle finger is only meaningful in societies that have norms about what those actions mean. Other societies establish different greetings that similarly regulate social interactions (e.g., kisses on the cheek, or placing palms together with a slight bow). Importantly, there is nothing inherent about these actions that make them right or wrong outside of group norms. In domain theory, morality is something that psychologically generalizes to members of other groups and cultures: If something is morally wrong, it is perceived as morally wrong for all groups, not just one’s own group.

Consistent with domain theory predictions, people judge and punish moral transgressors more severely than those who transgress social conventions (see Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 2006 for reviews). Moreover, people believe that moral rules do not depend on authorities. Children say that hitting and stealing are wrong, for example, even if an authority figure like a teacher tells them it is okay (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1981, 1984). Similarly, children obey moral requests (e.g., to stop fighting) made by any person, including other children, but they only endorse obedience to social norms (such as seat assignments) from legitimate authorities (Laupa, 1994). Children and adults reliably treat moral transgressions involving harm as more wrong, punishable, independent of structures of authority, and more universally wrong than
transgressions against social conventions, and these findings replicate well across cultures (e.g., Hollos et al., 1986; Huebner, Lee, & Hauser, 2010).²

Social conventions stretch across a continuum from arbitrary personal preferences (e.g., flavor preferences, getting a tattoo), to important and widely shared social standards subject to legitimate sanction (e.g., driving on the correct side of the street; Huebner et al., 2010). The boundaries between the moral and conventional domains may not always be perfectly sharp (e.g., Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; cf. Gray & Keeney, 2015), but are sharp enough that even very young children (e.g., 39 months) recognize and reliably distinguish between moral and conventional notions of right and wrong (Smetana & Braeges, 1990). Although the distinction between moral and conventional concerns is for the most part settled science in moral development, this distinction has been relatively glossed over in contemporary social psychological theories of morality, something we will also bring up later in this chapter.

Developmental theories and research dominated moral psychology for most of the 20th century and there continues to be interest in moral development, for example, the study of moral awareness of pre-verbal infants (e.g., Bloom, 2013; Van de Vondermoot & Hamlin, 2016). The turn of the millennium, however, witnessed a new surge of interest in moral psychology outside developmental psychology. This new wave of theory and research adopts a more descriptive than prescriptive approach and revitalized debates between the role of emotion and reason in people’s moral judgment. The turn of the millennium seemed to be a watershed moment with the introduction of two new theories: the social intuitionist model (or SIM, Haidt, 2001) and a dual process model (Greene, Summerville, Nystrom, Darley & Cohen, 2001) — that independently

² When authorities condone instrumental harm, such as interrogating terrorist suspects, such harm can seem more permissible (Kelly, Stich, Haley, Eng, & Fessler, 2007), but not when such harm also involves perceived rights violations (Sousa, Holbrook, & Piazza, 2009).
and jointly ignited a huge interest in questions of morality seemingly overnight; the field is still experiencing the ripple effects of this new focused attention on moral psychology nearly 20 years later. We first review the SIM and the dual process model, and then turn to a review of subsequent theories that have been proposed as alternatives to them.

*The Social Intuitionist Model (SIM)*

Haidt (2001) proposed a social intuitionist account of morality as a distinct counterpoint to the Kohlbergian focus on rationalism. He took seriously Hume's (1978/1888) claim that “Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular way. The rules of morality, therefore are not conclusions of our reason” (p. 325). Haidt proposed that moral judgments rarely if ever stem from conscious reasoning about moral concerns. Instead, moral judgments stem from intuition: “the sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment, including an affective valence (good-bad, like-dislike) without any conscious awareness of having gone through the steps of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring conclusion” (Haidt, 2001, p. 818). Moral intuitions are thought to be innate cognitive adaptions that evolutionarily developed to allow people to respond rapidly and effectively to challenges and opportunities faced by humans over long periods of time. After flashes of moral intuition cause judgments, reasoning nearly always operates as a post hoc justification to provide additional support.

Even though the social intuitionist model (SIM) of moral judgment places intuition (a form of cognition) as the central causal variable that leads people to recognize that something is moral or immoral, nearly all tests of the SIM have manipulated emotional cues (and in particular, disgust) because emotions are thought to trigger intuition (e.g., Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). For example, some researchers have focused on the emotion of disgust as a possible trigger for moral
intuitions. Some theorists conceptualize disgust as an evolutionarily adaptive response that allowed humans as an omnivorous species to decide what they could eat while avoiding parasites and illnesses that can be spread by physical contact (Rozin & Fallon, 1987). Disgust is thought to be an aversive cue that functionally generalized to facilitate rejection of socially non-adaptive or dangerous people or behaviors, such as cannibalism, incest, and betrayal (Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997). Therefore, Haidt (2001) reasoned that people respond aversively to transgressions largely because they experience a strong visceral sense of disgust when encountering one.

If the SIM is true, people should make moral judgments even when they are consciously unaware of what led them to make that judgment, and make harsher moral judgments of others’ actions when they experience a moralized emotion, such as disgust. To test this idea, Wheatley and Haidt (2005) gave research participants posthypnotic suggestions to feel disgust whenever they read an arbitrary word, and then judge the morality of harmless transgressions that either did or did not include the disgust-inducing word. People hypnotically induced to feel disgusted rated these transgressions as more wrong than those not induced to feel disgust. In other studies, disgust was induced with bad smells, working in a filthy room, or by recalling a physically disgusting experience (e.g., Schnall, Haidt, Clore & Jordan, 2008). Although some studies (like the ones mentioned above) support the SIM hypothesis that people’s moral judgments become amplified when participants are induced to feel disgust, a recent meta-analysis of 50 studies designed to test this hypothesis indicated that if moral amplification effects of disgust exist, the effect size is very small, it is limited only to some modes of induction (olfactory and gustatory, and not manipulations like cleanliness), and even in these modes, the effects are not robust to corrections for publication bias (Landy & Goodwin, 2015). Taken together, these findings
suggest that the SIM implication that incidental disgust is sufficient to lead to moral amplification effects has not received strong support.

The SIM also predicts that people should be able to make moral judgments and see the moral significance of something even in the absence of having reasons for claiming that it is wrong, such as when there is an absence of harm. In other words, people should not have clear access to why they make judgments that something is wrong, because they are making these judgments based on visceral and negative intuitions or feelings, rather than reasoning or conscious recognition of harm. To demonstrate the possibility of making moral judgments in the absence of reasons or harm, Haidt, Bjorklund, and Murphy (2000) asked a small sample of participants to react to hypothetical situations such as the following:

Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are traveling together in France on summer vacation from college. One night they are staying alone in a cabin near the beach. They decide that it would be interesting and fun if they tried making love. At the very least, it would be a new experience for each of them. Julie was already taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe. They both enjoy making love, but they decide never to do it again. They keep that night as a special secret, which makes them feel even closer to each other. What do you think about that? Was it ok for them to make love?

Because the scenario is carefully crafted to thwart the usual reasons one might avoid incest (e.g., the dangers of inbreeding), Haidt et al. reasoned that objections to it must therefore be due to something other than reasoning or reasons.

Many participants do find the Mark and Julie situation wrong, and persist in insisting it is wrong even in the absence of being able to provide evidence for its wrongness when challenged to do so by the experimenter (i.e., they are “morally dumbfounded,” Haidt et al., 2000). Other researchers, however, have found that participants do not believe that the protagonists’ actions in

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3 Haidt, Bjorklund, and Murphy (2000) has never been published, despite the paper being widely cited as evidence in support of moral intuitionism, largely because the research is more of a demonstration than an actual study or experiment: Variables were not manipulated and hypotheses were not tested.
these “harmless” scenarios are in fact harmless. Rather, participants are responding to these and other taboo defying scenarios as wrong jointly because they do not accept the experimenter’s insistence of no harm, and because the behaviors are excessively non-normative or weird (e.g., Gray & Keeney, 2015; Royzman, Kim, Leeman, 2015). To a considerable degree, however, interpretation of what the results of moral dumbfounding demonstrations mean and whether those results support the SIM’s moral intuition hypothesis hinges on philosophical (and not scientific) debates about what kinds of reasons should count as legitimate, rational, or real reasons for calling a behavior wrong (see Jacobson, 2012, and Royzman et al., 2015, for more details).

Dual Process Theory

At approximately the same time that Haidt’s (2001) social intuitionist model challenged older rationalist models, another model suggested that both affective and cognitive processes causally contribute to moral judgments—but different kinds of judgments. Greene and colleagues (2001) presented a dual process model to “steer a middle course between traditional rationalism and more recent emotivism that [has] dominated moral psychology” (p. 2107) based on responses to philosophical dilemmas where causing harm maximizes overall outcomes (Foot, 1967). The most famous example involves a certain errant rail car:

A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed if it proceeds on its present course. The only way to save them is to hit a switch that will turn the trolley onto an alternate set of tracks where it will kill one person instead of five. Ought you to turn the trolley in order to save five people at the expense of one? (Greene et al., 2001, p. 2105).

The original, ‘hard’ version of dual process theory suggests that when people encounter a moral dilemma, they immediately and involuntarily experience a negative, affect-laden reaction to the prospect of causing harm, leading them to reject harmful actions (consistent with
Given sufficient time, motivation, and resources, they may follow up with deliberative cognitive processing focused on weighing options to determine which action leads to better outcomes overall (consistent with utilitarian ethics; Greene et al., 2001). Ordinarily, these processes align because causing harm makes the world worse, but moral dilemmas present a rare case where maximizing the good requires harming someone. How people approach this dilemma provides a unique window into moral processing (Paxton & Greene, 2012). Although there are serious doubts about the temporal order of processes (i.e., whether affect precedes cognitive processing or vice versa) and the validity of a hard version of dual process theory (e.g., Baron, Gürçay, Moore, & Starcke, 2012), there is considerable support for a ‘softer’ dual process model. The soft version of the dual process model jettisons hypotheses about temporal order and retains only the claim that deontological judgments primarily reflect affective processing focused on performing harmful actions, whereas utilitarian judgments primarily reflect cognitive processing focused on achieving positive outcomes (Cushman 2013; Crockett, 2013).

The dual process model generated a dramatic rise in research that examined the contributions of affect and cognitive processing to moral dilemma responses. Early work noted that people typically accept causing harm in impersonal dilemmas such as the classic trolley

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4 According to deontological ethics, the morality of an action is determined by its intrinsic nature; harming one person to benefit others treats is fundamentally degrading and must be avoided at all costs (Kant, 1785/1959). Hence, decisions to reject causing harm on moral dilemmas are frequently referred to as deontological judgments. According to utilitarian ethics (a variant of consequentialism), the morality of an action depends on the consequences (utility) it produces (Mill, 1861/1998). Actions that produce net positive outcomes are morally acceptable, even if they entail causing harm. Hence, decisions to accept causing harm to maximize outcomes on moral dilemmas are frequently referred to as utilitarian judgments.

5 One challenge in this area of research is the tendency not to conceptually distinguish between a) the actual judgments people make, b) the psychological processes theorized to drive judgments, and c) the philosophical concepts those judgments are said to align with. Rejecting harm may be consistent with deontological ethics, for example, but this does not mean it was caused by philosophical considerations. Psychological processes that have nothing to do with rational adherence to deontological moral rules may lead to harm rejection judgments. Likewise, accepting outcome-maximizing harm is consistent with utilitarian ethics, but such judgments may not be caused by an impartial focus on overall utility (e.g., Kahane, 2015).
dilemma where causing harm involves merely pressing a button. Conversely, people typically reject causing harm on *personal* dilemmas like the footbridge dilemma where harm requires pushing someone off a footbridge to save five others using the personal force of one’s own hands (Greene et al., 2009, cf. Mikhail, 2007).\(^6\)

Participants who consider personal dilemmas or reject harm show greater activation in brain regions linked to social emotion processing, whereas participants considering impersonal dilemmas or who accept harm show greater activation in regions associated abstract reasoning (Greene et al., 2004). Likewise, individual differences in processing related to affective concerns about harm (e.g., empathic concern) predict increased harm rejection judgments (e.g., Gleichgerrcht & Young, 2013), whereas individual differences in processing related to deliberation over outcomes predict harm acceptance judgments (e.g., Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008). Manipulations inducing or suppressing emotion, as well as those that promote or undermine deliberative processing, tend to have corresponding impacts on dilemma judgments in line with dual process claims (e.g. Amit & Greene, 2012). In short, whether reasoning or emotion dominates people’s moral reasoning depends on both individual differences in cognitive and affective processing tendencies, as well as circumstances that promote or suppress cognitive and affective processing.

One challenge in dilemma research is that researchers treat dilemma decisions as dichotomous—participants must either accept or reject outcome-maximizing harm—or else assess responses along a continuum from one answer to the other. Thus, accepting the

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\(^6\) Other examples of impersonal dilemmas include the *fumes* dilemma—should one redirect deadly fumes to a room with one person instead of five?—and the *submarine* dilemma—should the captain of a damaged submarine lock a crewmember out of the oxygenated compartment to save enough oxygen for the rest of the crew?—whereas other personal dilemmas include the *crying baby* dilemma—should one smoother an infant to prevent its cries from summoning murderous soldiers?—and the *vitamins* dilemma—should one kill and harvest the kidneys of one jungle adventurer to save five others from a rare disease?
deontological answer entails rejecting the utilitarian answer and vice versa. Yet, researchers conceptualize the impact of affective and cognitive processes as independent and not opposing or hydraulic forces, whereby if one increases the other decreases. Rather, some people may experience more of both—they want both to avoid causing harm and to maximize outcomes, or little of either. If so, these competing motivations would largely cancel out, becoming invisible in the usual way dilemmas are analyzed or understood. Moreover, because researchers essentially measure the impact of affective and cognitive processing using a single dependent measure, they typically conflate the two, which leads to theoretical confusion.

Many researchers have reported that people make ‘more utilitarian’ dilemma decisions when their emotional concern for others is impaired, for example, whether via psychopathy, low empathic concern, or brain lesions (e.g., Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Gleichgerrcht & Young, 2013; Koenigs et al., 2007). Some theorists describe results like these (i.e., that psychopaths are utilitarians) as threats to the validity of dilemma research, because utilitarian decisions should reflect prosocial rather than antisocial motivations (something psychopaths are not thought to have). What these interpretations often fail to consider, however, is that perhaps utilitarian judgments in these cases reflect psychopaths’ and selected others’ mere willingness to sacrifice others rather than any desire to proactively and impartially help (e.g., Kahane et al., 2015; 2017). In other words, these findings may not reflect increased concern for utilitarian outcomes, but decreased concern about causing harm instead. But how to tell?

A recent solution to this challenge is to measure responses to different kinds of dilemmas, including dilemmas that do not pit affective and cognitive processing against each other, using techniques such as process dissociation (Conway & Gawronski, 2013) or multilevel modelling (Gawronski et al., 2015). The bulk of this research corroborates the basic affective-cognitive dual
process distinction: the deontological tendency to reject causing harm regardless of outcomes seems to reflect primarily affective processes, and the utilitarian tendency to maximize outcomes regardless of whether doing so causes harm seems to reflect primarily cognitive processes. This technique clarifies previous work. For example, process dissociation reveals that psychopathy correlates negatively with deontological responding (harm rejection), but either fails to correlate or correlates negatively with genuine utilitarian responding (Conway, Goldstein-Greenwood, Polacek, & Greene, 2018). Hence, psychopaths are not really ‘more utilitarian;’ they are ‘less deontological,’ corroborating the dual process model.7

This new strain of research corroborates the claim that dilemma responses reflect genuinely moral processing—tendencies invisible to conventional methods. For example, aversion to witnessing harm predicts both deontological and utilitarian responses tendencies (Reynolds & Conway, in press), as does moral identity internalization (Aquino & Reed, 2002). These dual positive relationships, however, cancel out in analyses that treat deontology and utilitarianism as opposites (measured on a single measure) rather than disassociating them instead. Hence, researchers should be careful when interpreting correlations and null effects in studies that do not disassociate deontological from utilitarian responses.

Taken together, research that disassociates how people make dilemma decisions rarely contradict the dual process claim that affective reactions to harm and cognitive evaluations of outcomes independently contribute to moral judgments. That said, this research nonetheless

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7 Recently, Gawronski and colleagues (2015, 2017) noted that deontological judgments in both conventional and process dissociation dilemmas always require avoiding causing harm. Hence, some participants currently classified as making deontological decisions may have simply wished to avoid personal involvement. Hence, they expanded upon the process dissociation framework to develop a CNI Model that distinguishes between decisions that maximize Consequences, follow deontological Norms, of result from general Inaction. This model is useful for disentangling different processes that the PD deontological parameter cannot distinguish. Yet, it is not directly comparable to previous dilemma research, which focuses on decisions to cause outcome-maximizing harm. The CNI model combines norms to refrain from causing harm with norms to save someone from harm, even though Kant (1785/1959) and lay people view these norms as qualitatively distinct (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009).
suggests the dual process model is too simplistic because we now know that some cognitive processes contribute to deontological responding (e.g., Gamez-Djokie & Molden, 2016), and some affective processes may contribute to utilitarian responding (e.g., Reynolds & Conway, in press). In addition, whereas many theorists have theorized deontological dilemma judgments as driven by intuitive, emotional responses to harm (Miller, Hannikainen, & Cushman, 2014), others have argued that deontological judgments entail adherence to moral rules, such as “do not harm” (e.g., Sunstein, 2005; Baron 1994) or a combination of emotional response and rule-based thinking (Nichols & Mallon, 2006). Research using dissociation methodology confirm that adherence to moral rules is another important contributor to dilemma judgments (Gawronski et al., 2017), in addition to the independent effects of affect (Conway, Velasquez, Reynolds, Forstmann, & Love, 2018). Finally, researchers are beginning to identify a multitude of new processes that impact dilemma judgments, such as strategic self-presentation (e.g., Rom & Conway, 2018). Taken together, it is clear that more than two processes explain how people react to moral dilemmas.

Research on moral dilemmas has provided insight into how people deal with difficult trade-offs between being a good person (e.g., don’t harm anyone) and doing good (e.g., saving lives). Examining difficult cases like these can advance our knowledge of the limits of both people’s commitment to being good and doing good. That said, some critics argue that hypothetical dilemmas are uninformative because they lack mundane realism (few people face such life-and death decisions in their everyday lives, and even if they did, they would seldom encounter anything like the trolley problem). Participants also report difficulty buying some assumptions, such as the idea that pushing a human into the path of a trolley could effectively

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8 However, when people in history have faced such dilemmas, the consequences have been enormous, such as when Truman deliberated the decision to use atomic weapons to prevent further war casualties (Gosnell, 1980).
stop it, chafe at the limited options they are provided for responding to the situation, or find some
dilemmas more amusing than alarming (Bauman, McGraw, Bartels, & Warren, 2014; Bennis,
Medin, & Bartels, 2010), all of which could threaten the validity of findings using this research
method.

Moral Psychology 2002-Present

Interest in moral psychology continued to grow after the watershed publications of the
SIM and the dual process theories. In addition to continuing to examine the relative roles of
emotion and reason in people’s moral judgments, theorists also began to debate the essence of
what moral concerns really are by testing ideas about underlying features that lead people to see
something in moral terms (e.g., moral foundations theory, the dyadic model of morality). These
programs of research continued to focus primarily on moral judgments, that is, factors that lead
people to make attributions of blame (and to a lesser degree, moral praise). Other researchers
branched out to study aspects of the moral self, or moral identity. Most theory and research since
2000 have worked deductively, starting with theorists’ definitions of moral foundations (for
example) to generate hypotheses. However, other research has taken a more inductive approach,
and started with lay people’s perceptions of morality instead. We devote the remainder of this
chapter to reviewing these different strains of contemporary moral psychology.

Moral Foundations Theory

Moral foundations theory (MFT) was proposed later than either the SIM or the dual
process theories, but to some degree built on the SIM by attempting to articulate the specific
kinds of moral intuitions people might have. Building largely on insights from cultural
anthropology, MFT was designed to describe broad cultural (and very soon after, ideological)
differences in what people consider as moral. Based on their reading of cultural anthropology,
MF theorists proposed that there are five core moral concerns or “modules,” each with positive and negative valences: Harm/care, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2007; Haidt & Graham, 2007; see Graham et al., 2013 for a review, cf. Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). Modules are thought to be evolutionarily adapted response tendencies, or “little bits of input-output programming, ways of enabling fast and automatic responses to specific emotional triggers” that behave much like cognitive heuristics (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, p. 60). Moreover, “when a module takes the conduct or character of another person as its input and emits a sense of approval or disapproval, that output is a moral intuition” (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, p. 60), which in turn has a unique emotional signature. Suffering triggers compassion, corrupt behavior triggers contempt, cannibalism triggers disgust, and so on. Although the intuitive triggers themselves are thought to be universal, how people respond to them can be molded by culture or group specific norms as part of socialization (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009).

Most research inspired by MFT so far has not focused as much on testing its key premises (e.g., whether the foundations are modular or operate intuitively), but instead, has been inspired by the early finding that liberals and conservatives endorse each of these foundations as morally relevant to different degrees. Liberals perceive harm and fairness as more important than authority, loyalty, and purity in their moral thinking. Conservatives, in contrast, view all five moral foundations as approximately equally important moral concerns (Graham et al., 2009).

Although MFT has generated a lot of research in the short time since its original formulation (see Graham et al., 2013 for a thorough review), it has also been subject to

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9 Haidt and colleagues have been open to expanding the number of foundations to other possibilities including liberty/oppression, efficiency/waste, and ownership/theft. Criteria for foundationhood are that the premise has to be observed in many cultures, and there has to be a Darwinian explanation for why humans may have developed these concerns (Graham et al., 2013).
considerable criticism. Among other things, critics are concerned that the theory lacks conceptual clarity on what constitutes a foundation, about the lack of evidence to support the notion that morality is modular or innate, and even some evidence that can be marshalled to suggest they are not in fact modular (e.g., Suhler & Churchland, 2011). Some scholars reject the MFT’s pluralist perspective and argue that all morality comes down to the dimension of harm (Gray, Young & Waytz, 2012). From a domain theory perspective, one can also argue that only the harm and fairness dimensions are truly moral, and the other foundations represent conventional beliefs instead and would fail key definitional tests of the constitutional properties of morality (e.g., authority independence, and perceived universal applicability, e.g., Jost, 2009).

Still others criticize MFT for missing other vital elements of morality (e.g., Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013), or have found evidence of other key moral concerns when working inductively from people’s moral concerns (e.g., honesty/dishonesty, self-discipline, Hofmann, Wisneski, Brandt & Skitka, 2015). Finally, some argue that MFT does not pay enough attention to the relational context in which concerns about morality arise and play themselves out (Rai & Fiske, 2011). Progress on resolving most of these issues has been hampered by psychometric problems with the different versions of the measures developed to try to measure the moral foundations, which have weak scale reliabilities, and frequently cluster into two rather than five factors. The authors of MFT acknowledge these criticisms and discuss ways that future research can address these concerns (see Graham et al., 2013).

Despite its detractors, MFT has been incredibly generative of research, some of it yielding important new insights, such as how to more successfully frame persuasive appeals for different audiences. Liberals are more persuaded, for example, by messages framed in terms of
the individuating foundations, whereas conservatives are more persuaded by messages framed in terms of the binding foundations (e.g., Day, Fiske, Downing, & Trail, 2014).

**The Dyadic Model of Morality**

The dyadic model of morality was proposed as an alternative to MFT. According to this theoretical perspective, mind perception is the essence of morality (Gray et al., 2012; Schein & Gray, 2017). Morality arises as a function of an awareness that there are two kinds of minds: An intending mind that belongs to moral agents, and an experiencing mind that belongs to moral patients. Moral agents’ minds are focused on intention, knowledge, and belief, whereas patients’ minds are focused on emotions. A prototypical immoral act is one in which an agent intentionally causes harm to a patient who therefore suffers. When acts conform to this prototype, people can easily make judgments of blame. Dyadic theorists argue that because all morality can be reduced to intention and suffering, it logically follows that there is really only a single moral essence: harm. Dyadic moral theory is therefore diametrically opposed to pluralistic moral theories, such as MFT, that posit that concerns about morality can be based on other considerations absent any recognition of harm, such as purity or loyalty.

Consistent with the idea that mind perception is closely tied to perceptions of morality/immorality, people find great harm, including genocide, as more morally acceptable when they ascribe a weakened capacity of the targeted group to experience uniquely human emotions (that is, when they infrahumanize the victims, Castano & Giner-Sorolla 2006). Conversely, people can see harm in apparently victimless acts by ascribing more mind to animals (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, & Hodson, 2012), fetuses (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007), vegetative patients (Gray, Knickman, & Wegner, 2011), and robots (Gray & Wegner, 2012;
Ward, Olsen, & Wegner, 2013). In short, the perception of harm and suffering minds appears to be implicated in people’s willingness to recognize moral wrongs.

An implication of the dyadic theory of morality is that whenever people make a judgment that something is morally wrong, they will also perceive an agent intentionally inflicting harm, and a patient who suffers. To explicitly test this idea, Gray, Schein, and Ward (2014) examined people’s reactions to four presumably victimless but impure scenarios (e.g., masturbating to a picture of one’s dead sister, covering a bible with feces), four harmful transgressions (e.g., insulting a colleague’s obesity, kicking a dog hard), and four neutral scenarios (e.g., eating toast). Participants were asked to judge how wrong these actions were, and whether they perceived a victim under conditions of time pressure or no time pressure. Although participants did not make as strong of wrongness/victim judgments of the impure as they did the harm scenarios, they nonetheless inferred more wrongness and victims than they did in the control condition (especially under time pressure). Ostensibly harmless wrongs also activate concepts of harm, and increase perceptions of suffering relative to controls (Gray et al., 2014). Results like these are argued by Gray and colleagues as presenting a major challenge to MFT: Rather than there being several moral foundations (not only harm, but also fairness, loyalty, authority, and impurity), Gray and colleagues argue that the essence of morality reduces to a core psychological perception of harm inflicted by an intentional agent on a suffering patient because even in the absence of an objective victim or clear harm, people mentally insert these aspects to facilitate dyadic completion.

Whereas MFT originated from insights from cultural anthropology, the dyadic approach to morality is more distinctively psychological. It provides an overarching framework geared toward describing the cognitive and emotional mechanisms that give rise to people’s experiences
with morality, and therefore connects research on morality with mainstream theories about basic
cognitive and emotional processes. This approach also highlights the idea that morality is
fundamentally relational, a view consistent with functionalist perspectives that view morality as
a system that facilitates social interaction (e.g., Krebs, 2008; Rai & Fiske, 2011). That said, it
remains unclear just how much some aspects of the theory move the field as a whole forward,
given there already were very well-established programs of research that emphasize the role of
personal causality and attributions in the way people assign blame (e.g., Alicke, 2000; Shaver,
1985; Weiner, 1995), connections other theorists have already noted (e.g., Cushman, 2008;
Guglielmo & Malle, 2010; Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011). Moral agency appears to be a catchall
label for these well-understood attributional processes.

The dyadic model’s focus on moral patiency in addition to agency, however, is a more
novel contribution; previous theory and research have tended to almost exclusively consider
actors. Unlike actor-only models, a model that explicitly incorporates moral patiency provides a
way to understand how and when people differentiate between moral versus amoral situations.
Morality is relevant, for example, when someone kicks another person, but not when a person
kicks a bicycle tire because the former situation involves a suffering mind, and the other does not
(Bauman et al., 2012).

The dyadic theory has been critiqued, however, on a number of grounds. One challenge is
how to account for the perceived immorality of self-harm. Although dyadic theorists argue that
the self serves as both the agent and patient in these situations, the critique nonetheless remains
that the situation is not dyadic (see Alicke, 2012). Other issues involve how to interpret people’s
reactions to presumably harmless moral dilemmas. Although there is some evidence that people
have implicit associations and insert the missing victim or harm into the scenarios in a form of
dyadic completion (e.g. Gray et al., 2014), not everyone is persuaded by the logic or evidence offered to date (e.g., Alicke, 2012; Pizarro, Tannebaum, & Uhlmann, 2012).

A narrow emphasis on harm also ignores a host of other variables known to affect moral judgments about transgressions (e.g., outcome bias; e.g., Mazzocco, Alicke, & Davis, 2004), and does not do a good job explaining people’s concerns about the broader social good, that are often expressed in moral terms (e.g., Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013). Describing issues people often see in a moral light—such as same-sex marriage or immigration—in dyadic terms, for example, would require attributing minds to a nation or the body politic, something that many see as a stretch (e.g., Bauman et al., 2012; Carnes & Janoff-Bulman, 2012; Rai & Fiske, 2012).

Recent research also poses some challenges for the dyadic model. For example, a comparison of Chinese and Western samples revealed that when asked to generate examples of immorality, Westerners more frequently generated examples of harm (e.g., killing), whereas the Chinese generated examples of incivility (e.g., spitting in the street) (Buchtel et al., 2015). Another more open-ended examination of the kinds of things people see in a moral light similarly found many examples that cannot be easily understood as harms, and also found that people reported many more examples of beneficence than harm when asked about their everyday moral and immoral experiences (Hofmann et al., 2015). The model also does not account for people’s moral strivings, or desires to both do good and be good, or the kind of morality people attach to altruism and heroism (e.g., Walker & Frimer, 2007; Monroe, 2002). For these and a variety of other reasons, the strong claim that morality is only about agents harming patients seems to be an incomplete account of the role morality plays in people’s lives and moral motivations (see also Dillon & Cushman, 2012; Koleva & Haidt, 2012; Monroe, Guglielmo, & Malle, 2012; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2012).
Moral Motives Theory

Like the dyadic theory of morality, the moral motives model (MMM) was proposed as an alternative to MFT. The MMM builds on dual process theories of motivation and self-regulation to argue that people’s moral motivations are fundamentally approach or avoidance oriented (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013). Proscriptive morality (rooted in avoidance motivations) is focused on what people should not do, and on protecting against harms. Prescriptive morality (rooted in approach motivations), in contrast, focuses on what people should do, and on providing for people’s well-being and the social good. Janoff-Bulman and Carnes (2013) further argue that moral motives operate at three different regulatory levels: self-regulation, interpersonal regulation, and social or collective regulation (see Figure 1).

This model explicitly tries to lay out the different ways morality plays out in social life. Sometimes morality is focused on self-regulation, such as restraint and industriousness. Other times, morality is focused on how we interact with individual others, such as avoiding telling falsehoods and helping others. Morality, however, also plays out on a broader societal level. At the macro level, prescriptive concerns about social order are responsive to dangers and threats to the group, and oriented toward shoring up the moral perimeter. Similarly, macro level prescriptive concerns about social justice refer to communal responsibility to advance the group’s welfare (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013; 2016).

Figure 1. The moral motives model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proscriptive Morality (Avoidance)</th>
<th>Self (Personal)</th>
<th>Other (Interpersonal)</th>
<th>Group (Collective)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-Restraint</td>
<td>Not Harming</td>
<td>Social Order</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition to proposing that moral motives come in approach and avoidance forms, another key proposition of the MMM is that people on the political left and right are likely to be attracted to or governed more by one set of motives than another, especially at the societal level. Specifically, the MMM predicts that liberals’ societal level sense of morality is likely to be more approach oriented (i.e., social justice), whereas conservatives’ societal level moral motives are more likely to be avoidance oriented (i.e., social order).

There are several points of contrast between the MMM and other contemporary models of morality. First, the MMM can be contrasted with most other theories of morality by the degree to which it places theoretical weight on approach and not only avoidance moral motives. Most other contemporary theorists tend to describe morality in terms of suppression of immorality, or judgments of third party transgressions, and avoidance, and not in terms of people’s desire to approach ideals or moral goods. The MMM, in contrast, focuses as much on people’s striving for the good, and not only their avoidance of the bad. In addition, the MMM takes issue with one implication of MFT, specifically, that by implication, liberals do not have a morality focused on the greater group because they do not endorse the binding foundations as strongly as conservatives do. MMM argues instead that MFT overlooked a prescriptive form of group morality (i.e., a concern for social justice) in large part because MFT is generally more oriented toward describing avoidance to the relative neglect of approach moral motives.

Consistent with the idea that morality comes in both approach and avoidance forms (rather than being primarily or only about the latter), people believe that others should be equally motivated to engage in moral actions as they are to avoid engaging in immoral actions (Janoff-
Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009). Other research finds that people’s morally motivated political engagement is better explained by people’s hopes about the benefits of their preferred policy outcomes than by their fears about the harms of their non-preferred policy outcomes (Skitka et al., 2017). Taken together, the MMM emphasis on the idea that people are not only morally motivated by suppression or avoidance, but are motivated by approach considerations as well, with respect to themselves, their interpersonal relationships, and the common good has been a useful addition to our understanding of moral psychology.

The Moral Self and Moral identity

Although most of the theory and research we have reviewed in this chapter so far has focused on moral judgments, another stream of inquiry has focused more on moral motivations and behavior. To a considerable degree, this branch of moral psychology began as a reaction to some of the limitations of Kolhberg’s stage theory (Bergman, 2002). As Damon (1984) argued, “A person’s level of moral judgment does not determine the person’s views on morality’s place in one’s life. To know how an individual deals with the latter issue, we must know about not only the person’s moral beliefs but also the person’s understanding of the self in relation to those beliefs” (p. 110). This line of inquiry led to the discovery that in most cases, the answer to the question of “why be moral” is because “that is who I am.” In other words, people behave morally because they strive for self-consistency with their views of themselves as moral beings (Blasi, 1980, 1984). Consistent with this idea, people’s ability to live up to internalized notions of “ought” and “should” has an important impact on their sense of personal identity (Bandura, 1986; Higgins, 1987; Steele, 1988, 1999) and individual differences in moral desires, rather than moral capacity (i.e., moral reasoning ability) account for individual differences in prosocial and moral behavior (see Hardy & Carlo, 2005 for a review).
Aquino and Reed (2002) refined the concept of moral identity into a social cognitive model of the moral self. They argued that the cognitive accessibility of people’s sense of moral identity is a potent regulator of behavior (Aquino & Reed, 2002; see also Lapsley & Lasky, 2001; Narvaez, Lapsley, Hagele, & Lasky, 2006). Unlike character approaches to moral identity, social-cognitive conceptualizations of moral identity posit that situational cues can affect the relative accessibility of people’s sense of moral identity, and therefore whether they will behave morally in any given situation. Because people must balance multiple and competing identities, the regulatory influence of people’s moral identities depend on whether this particular identity is currently part of their working self-concept (Markus & Kunda, 1985; Skitka, 2003). Consistent with these ideas, the relative accessibility of moral identity motivates increased prosocial and reduced antisocial behavior (for a review, see Shao, Aquino, & Levy, 2008), and in particular motivates prosociality with respect to outgroup members (Reed & Aquino, 2003).

Moral licensing and credentials. More recent research has built on the idea that people might be motivated to engage in moral balancing or moral licensing with respect to both themselves and others. When people feel that they have been or are especially moral, they may feel a psychological license to reduce subsequent moral strivings (Miller & Effron, 2010). For example, people who reject sexist or racist statements at one time sometimes go on to subsequently endorse sexist or racist decisions shortly thereafter (Effron, Cameron, & Monin, 2009). Similarly, people who donate to one charity are more likely to spurn a request to give to second charity (Sachdeva, Iliev, Medin, 2009), and people who reduce consumption in one domain for pro-environmental reasons sometimes offset this behavior by increasing consumption in another (Mazar & Zhong, 2010; for reviews, see Effron & Conway, 2015).
One explanation for why moral licensing occurs is that people experience momentary fluctuations in their moral self-perceptions around a personalized equilibrium (Monin & Jordan, 2009; Mullen & Monin, 2016). Doing something morally good boosts the moral self-concept above equilibrium, and a subsequent transgression restores people’s equilibrium. According to this view, people strive to maintain a balance of credits and debits to a psychological “bank account” (Miller & Effron, 2010; Nisan & Kurtines, 1991).

Other accounts for moral licensing effects posit that it is more a matter of self-construal than it is psychological balance. For example, one study found that reminding people that they voted for Barack Obama just before the 2008 election led them to be more willing to make racist judgments later, something that did not occur when they expressed support for a White presidential candidate or when they identified Obama as the younger of two presidential candidates without an opportunity to endorse him (Effron, Cameron, & Monin, 2009). A moral credits or balancing interpretation of this finding is that people were more comfortable expressing racist attitudes because they had been reminded that they previously had done something non-racist (i.e., they supported Obama).

A licensing via construal interpretation, however, is that people did not perceive their subsequent behavior as racist at all; after all, they couldn’t be racist because (as they had just been reminded), they had supported Obama (Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010; Monin & Miller, 2001). It seems likely that credentials and credits models each apply in different circumstances. When behavior is clear and easily interpreted as morally positive or negative (e.g., donating money to charity), the credits account likely best explains findings, because people must balance morally questionable deeds with laudatory ones over time to feel good about themselves. Conversely, when behavior is ambiguous and open to interpretation (e.g., was that comment due
to racism or other factors?), then the credentials model likely best explains findings, because people seek to establish credentials to clarify the ostensible meaning behind their ambiguous actions (Miller & Effron, 2010).

Whereas classic moral self and moral identity theory suggests that moral self-perceptions motivate moral striving (Hardy & Carlo, 2005), moral licensing work conceptualizes the moral self as a self-regulatory mechanism that helps people balance self-interest with societal interest. Researchers have identified a number of moderating factors that may influence whether moral self-perceptions increase or reduce moral strivings (e.g., Conway & Peetz, 2012), but more work remains to be done to tease out when one or the other effect is most likely to emerge (see Blanken, van de Ven, & Zeelenberg, 2015; Mullen & Monin, 2016; Simbrunner, & Schlegelmilch, 2017).

**Inductive Approaches to Moral Psychology**

One way to start thinking about moral psychology is to turn to philosophy or cultural anthropology for ideas to inform theory. Another approach is to start from the bottom up or inductively. An example of this approach is Buchtel et al.’s (2015) research that asked people from different cultural backgrounds to provide examples of immoral acts, and to examine their similarities and differences. Unlike Westerners, her Chinese sample did not generate examples of mostly harmful acts; they generated examples of incivility instead (e.g., littering). We briefly review two other examples of inductive approaches to studying morality, and what they can tell us about the feasibility of existing theoretical accounts of moral psychology.

**Everyday Morality**

Almost all research examining morality has drawn heavily on well-controlled but artificial laboratory settings, and a heavy reliance on hypothetical dilemmas. In response to this
fact, Hofmann, Wisneski, Brandt, and Skitka (2014) embarked on a large-scale effort to use ecological momentary assessment to explore how morality plays out in people’s everyday lives. The goal of the project was to explore how often people commit, witness, or learn about moral and immoral acts in their daily lives, what kinds of experiences they label as moral and immoral, how well existing taxonomies (e.g., MFT) can account for these experiences, and a variety of other questions, such as whether committing a moral act boosts people’s momentary sense of happiness and sense of purpose. A large ($N = 1252$), demographically and geographically diverse Western sample was randomly signaled 5 times daily on their smartphones for 3 days between 9 AM and 9 PM. At each assessment, participants indicated whether they committed, were the target of, witnessed, or learned about a moral or immoral act within the last hour (they could also respond “none of the above”). For each moral or immoral event, they described via text entry what the event was about, and provided contextual information (e.g., location, relationship) and rated a number of emotions, happiness, and sense of moral purpose, yielding 13,240 reports. Participants were most likely to report committing moral acts and learning about immoral acts. The reported acts were more likely to be moral than immoral, and the majority emphasized acts of caring, followed by harm and unfairness. Although most events could be classified in terms of moral foundations, this research also found reliably high mentions of events that could not be easily understood in the original MFT terms, including examples of liberty/oppression$^{10}$, honesty/dishonesty, and self-discipline or the lack of it.$^{11}$

$^{10}$ Later versions of MFT have included liberty as a candidate foundation (Haidt, 2012).
$^{11}$ Especially given the emphasis on studying reactions to moral dilemmas to understand moral psychology, it may be somewhat surprising that not one participant in this study brought up a run away trolley, incest, or chicken carcasses 😐.
Political orientation was associated with the examples of immorality/morality people reported, but these differences were more a matter of nuance than stark contrast. Religious and nonreligious participants did not differ in the likelihood or kind of committed moral and immoral acts, contrary to stereotypes of religious people as morally superior. Finally, being the target of moral or immoral actions had the strongest impact on people’s sense of happiness, whereas committing moral or immoral acts had the strongest impact on people’s sense of purpose.

Taken together, this research seems to support the idea that morality comes in more than one basic form (consistent with the basic premise of MFT, and in contrast to the dyadic model), even if harm and beneficence are the dominant components of everyday morality. Moreover, people’s everyday experiences of morality/immorality are equally if not more likely to be positively valenced as they are negatively valenced (consistent with the emphasis of MMM on approach and not only avoidance moral orientations).

*Moral Conviction*

Another inductive approach to the study of morality has examined the antecedents and consequences of the perception that an attitude is a reflection of one’s moral beliefs. People vary in the degree to which they report that their attitudes reflect moral convictions, something even true of issues we tend to think of as normatively moral, such as abortion (for a review, see Skitka, 2014). Someone might have a pro-choice position on abortion, for example, simply because she prefers to have a back-up form of birth control, and not because of any moral attachment to the issue. Someone else, however, may see her position on this issue as a reflection of her core moral beliefs. This variation in the moral significance people attach to certain issues has a number of social and political consequences. People higher in moral conviction about a given issue are more intolerant of those who do not share their position on the issue, are
unwilling to compromise or accept procedural solutions about the issue, are inoculated against the normal pressures to either conform or obey authorities (including the law) with respect to this issue, and are more willing to accept violence if it serves the perceivers’ moralized end. Consistent with domain theory predictions, attitudes that are experienced as moral convictions are perceived as more universally and objectively true than attitudes that are weak moral convictions (see Skitka, 2010, Skitka & Morgan, 2014 for reviews).

Recent research has attempted to begin to understand how attitudes become moralized. Targeted emotional cues experienced at conscious levels of awareness (e.g., exposure to photos of aborted fetuses), but not incidental emotional cues (e.g., exposure to photos of mutilated animals or people, or toilets overflowing feces) or cues presented at subliminal levels of awareness, led to increased moralization of abortion attitudes (Wisneski & Skitka, 2017). Other research that examined attitudes toward candidates over the 2012 presidential election cycle found that emotions (enthusiasm and hostility) predicted increased moralization of preferred and non-preferred candidates, respectively. Perceived harms and benefits associated with electing each candidate, however, were only consequences of increased moralization, rather than antecedents of it (Brandt, Wisneski, & Skitka, 2015). Taken together, these results challenge the idea that morality is necessarily intuitive (as predicted by the SIM and MFT), or exclusively rooted in perceptions of harm (as predicted by the dyadic model, see also Skitka, Wisneski, & Brandt, 2017).

Issues of Replicability

Finally, let us briefly consider issues of replicability in moral psychology. Like work in the rest of the field, some (particularly older) research in moral psychology has suffered from relatively slim samples, incomplete reporting, lack of preregistration, and other features that
increase the likelihood of introducing erroneous findings into the published literature. In a few high-profile cases, ostensibly well-established effects (e.g., Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009) have been challenged by null findings in replication studies (e.g., Johnson, Cheung, & Donnellan, 2014; Blanken, van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Meijers, 2014). However, such cases have typically been followed up with meta-analytic investigations that clarify effect sizes and the conditions or domains where effects appear stronger or weaker (e.g., Landy & Goodwin, 2015; Blanken, van de Ven, & Zeelenberg, 2015). Moreover, it seems the majority of work in moral psychology does not suffer from considerable replication issues, because many independent laboratories document similar findings. The basic pattern of responding to trolley and footbridge moral dilemmas, for example, has been replicated dozens (if not hundreds) of times, and emerges for children as young as three (Pellizzoni et al., 2010).

One possibility for why much of the work in moral psychology seems replicable might relate to the fact that moral concerns appear inherently interesting and tend to matter a great deal to lay people. Research on moral topics, therefore, may benefit from increased attention to the focal information and reduced extraneous factors than obscure effects in research on other issues. Consistent with this possibility, a number of findings suggest that moral information carries a powerful influence over judgments and behavior that often trumps nonmoral information (e.g., Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014; Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Certainly, there is always room to improve the quality of science, and all claims should be approached with a degree of skepticism. That said, the primary challenges in moral psychology are disagreements over theoretical and conceptual issues rather than disagreements about methodological decisions or the reliability of results.

Discussion and Conclusion
Our goal in this chapter was to provide readers with a broad overview of theory and research in moral psychology. There is almost an embarrassment of empirical and theoretical riches in moral psychology, including much more than we could adequately cover in the page limits here. One thing that is clear from this review is how incredibly active and dynamic the field currently is; new theories, approaches, and findings emerge almost daily, especially since the turn of the millennium. It is a very exciting time to study moral psychology, and each new contribution reveals new factors and considerations that need further study.

As we noted at the outset of this chapter, moral psychology is currently better characterized as a field with competing perspectives rather than theoretical or empirical consensus. The lack of consensus and the speed with which new theoretical perspectives have emerged in the field presents both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, the field can feel fragmented and difficult to synthesize into a coherent whole. What, for example, do moral licensing effects have in common with moral judgments or moral convictions? How does what we know about the psychology of moral dilemmas inform or have in common with MFT, or the MMM?

On the other hand, each new theoretical perspective emphasizes slightly different aspects and elements that generally turn out to be important. The idea that morality might not only be about deliberative reasoning, for example, has led to a much richer and nuanced understanding of the independent and intersecting roles of reason, intuition, and emotion in moral judgment. The idea that mind perception is intimately involved in moral judgment led to taking into account the perspective of not only the agent of harm, but the target of it as well, in the dyadic model of morality. The emphasis on harm in the dyadic model and on social order in MFT, however, led others to posit that theory and research might be neglecting the prescriptive and approach side of
morality and people’s striving to be good, which was subsequently incorporated into the MMM. Even if this period of theory and research might be characterized as reactionary or fragmented, it has nonetheless has been incredibly generative—the field as a whole is perhaps only beginning the grasp the full complexity of what it is attempting to describe. After all, humans attach moral significance to behavior, decisions, aspects of character, emotions, and more. Humans both reason about and intuit morality. Morality is perceived by many to have universal elements but nonetheless varies in form across cultures. Morality involves minds, emotions, convictions, values, and is something we use to regulate ourselves, our interpersonal conduct, and how we define the collective good.

In other words, the task of moral psychology is BIG. One could say it is a big as the elephant encountered in John Godfrey Saxe’s parable of the blind men of Indostan. Each man was asked to approach and describe an elephant. Because each examined a different part of the elephant they came to very different conclusions about the fundamental character of “elephantness” (“it is very like a tree,” “a wall,” or “a snake”). The tree, wall, and snake descriptions were each accurate but limited perspectives on the elephant; one man accurately describes the elephant’s leg, another its body, and yet another, its trunk. We suspect morality researchers are at a similar stage as the men from Indostan in getting a sense of what, exactly, we are studying: As a field, we are still in the process of assembling descriptions of a very big and complex animal. Only with time will we be able to bring these descriptions together into a broader theoretical whole.
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