

Willingness to Provide Post-War Aid to Iraq and Kuwait: An Application of the Contingency Model of Distributive Justice

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Despite considerable historical precedent for providing assistance to war-torn countries at the end of wars, there has been little investigation of public perceptions of these practices. Based on current theories of attribution and distributive justice, this study was designed to investigate factors influencing people's willingness to provide post-war assistance to Iraq and Kuwait. Data were collected at the beginning and end of the Persian Gulf ground war. Subjects allocated the amount of the total needed to rebuild Iraq and Kuwait that they thought was fair after being primed with either a pessimistic or optimistic economic forecast. Attribution of responsibility for the war was the best predictor of aid allocated to Iraq, followed by political ideology, and then scarcity. Scarcity was the best predictor of aid to Kuwait. Results are interpreted in the context of a contingency theory of distributive justice.

When people are confronted with negative and unexpected events, such as the Persian Gulf War, they are likely to engage in attributional analysis (e.g. Bohner, Bless, Schwarz & Strack, 1988). During the military build-up in the Persian Gulf, many attempts were made to influence the kinds of attributions the American public made for why we needed to go to war, including to "keep Saddam from getting Nukes;" to bring peace-and-stability to the Middle East; the "New World Order" argument; and avoidance of re-living the 1930's blindness to the build-up of Nazi Germany. President Bush, in the State of the Union address, deferred responsibility, pointing his finger at Saddam Hussein: "The war in the gulf is not a war we wanted. We worked hard to avoid war. For more than five months we ... tried every diplomatic avenue ... But time and time again, Saddam Hussein flatly rejected the path of diplomacy and peace." In other words, it's Saddam Hussein's fault. Hussein likewise pointed the

finger at United States's imperialism and meddling in what was a regional, not global, issue.

Regardless of the objective answers to who or what was responsible for the Persian Gulf War, there are important implications associated with people's subjective impressions of moral responsibility in this context. Judgments of moral responsibility are made quickly, defended tenaciously, and have important implications on people's willingness to help others (Shaver, 1985). The present study investigated how people's attributions of responsibility for the Persian Gulf War and associated affective reactions influenced how much they believed the United States should help rebuild Iraq and Kuwait once hostilities ceased.

Despite considerable historical precedent for U.S. intervention and post-war foreign aid (e.g. the U.S. provided a great deal of support to Japan, Germany, and most of Europe after World War II, as well as to South Korea after the Korean conflict) there has been little investigation of public support for these practices, especially people's willingness to assist countries who are perceived as instigators of war. The onset of the Persian Gulf conflict provided an opportunity to investigate these issues.

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Theoretical background

The intuitive notion that people will be reluctant to help those perceived to be responsible for war has sound grounding in social psychological theory and research. Weiner (1986) for instance, has specified a three-stage model whereby initial accounts (such as "the war was caused by a greedy foreign despot" or "the war was stage-managed by our political leaders to distract the public from domestic problems") are processed according to the following sequence: (1) causal analysis (attribution of cause along the dimensions of locus and control); (2) affective arousal (different explanations are associated with different affective reactions (e.g. anger or sympathy) and (3) behavioral decision (in this case, to provide or withhold post-war aid). Considerable support has accumulated for this model in several domains including achievement, helping, and aggression (see review in Weiner, 1986). Experimental research on attribution and helping points to one clear-cut conclusion: People are least likely to help victims whose need is attributed to internal-controllable causes, such as greed, self-indulgence or laziness (Reisenzein, 1986; Weiner, 1986).

Skitka and Tetlock (1990, 1991) recently extended this model to explain allocation of political resources, such as health care or welfare. They found that in addition to the cognition-affect sequence, allocations were shaped profoundly by the relative availability of resources, abstract distributive norms, and attributes of judges. Skitka and Tetlock's (1991) contingency model predicts that allocators of assistance go through one to four stages of analysis. First, allocators evaluate resource availability: Are there sufficient resources to help those in need? If there is a sufficient supply to help all those who require assistance, assistance is provided and analysis stops. If there is not an abundant supply of resources, allocators move on to a second stage of analysis: Causal appraisal of why claimants need assistance. If claims are attributed to internal-controllable causes (that is, claimants are perceived to be personally responsible for needing

assistance), negative affect is aroused, and help is withheld. If claims are attributed to other causes, allocators move on to appraisal of claimants' relative deservingness: Can resources be used more effectively by some claimants? Are some claims more urgent than others?

Finally, allocators distribute available resources. If there is low scarcity (there are sufficient resources available such that not all personally responsible claimants must be denied assistance), everyone who is not responsible for needing assistance will receive help, and personally responsible claimants will receive help to the extent that they have high need or assistance is highly likely to be effective. If there is high scarcity (there are fewer resources than non-personally responsible claimants), then no internal-controllable claimants will receive assistance, and only claimants with other causes of need, and high need and efficiency will receive available help.

Research using hypothetical claimants who varied in description as a function of locus of responsibility, need and efficiency, has found support for hypotheses generated by this contingency model in a variety of resource domains, including AZT for AIDS victims; organ transplants, and low-income housing (Skitka & Tetlock, 1990; 1991). Results indicated that under high scarcity conditions, allocators experienced more negative and less positive affect towards personally responsible claimants, and denied them assistance. Need and efficiency emerged as especially powerful joint predictors of allocating aid to claimants who were not responsible for their predicament under high scarcity. Under low scarcity conditions, all claimants with other causes of need (internal-controllable, external-controllable, external-uncontrollable) typically received assistance, as well as personally responsible claimants with high need and efficiency. Under no scarcity, politically conservative allocators withheld resources from those personally responsible for their needs regardless of severity of need or likelihood of effective helping, whereas liberals tended to provide aid to all claimants.

Consistent with Tomkins's (1965) theory of ideo-affective scripts (how people learn to affectively react to others will also determine their general posture towards the entire ideological domain; conservatives learn to react negative-

ly, and liberals learn to react positively), Skitka and Tetlock (1991) also found that political conservatism was negatively correlated with sympathy for, and deservingness ratings of, all claimants regardless of cause of need. In addition, conservatism was associated with lower ratings of sympathy and deservingness for all claimants. Liberals, on the other hand, expressed more sympathy and pity to targets with internal causes of need and less disgust and distaste and higher ratings of deservingness for all claimants.

Skitka and Tetlock's (1991) research explored not only the situational and ideological boundaries of Weiner's cognition-affect-action theory, but also extended current theories of distributive justice (such as Leventhal, 1976; Deutsch, 1985) by discovering that distributive principles are not sufficient in and of themselves to explain allocation behavior in political domains. The advent of the Persian Gulf War provided an opportunity to explore the generalizability of Skitka and Tetlock's contingency model of distributive justice beyond the scope of domestic concerns. Do people feel a moral obligation to provide financial assistance to war-torn nations once the shooting stops? And does such an obligation extend to countries that are perceived as responsible for starting the war in the first place? How salient are attributional factors relative to other considerations when deciding how much post-war assistance should be provided? Is willingness to provide post-war aid influenced by perceived scarcity of resources (e.g., the recession and concerns with deficit spending)? Based on Skitka and Tetlock's research, resource scarcity, need, and efficiency are likely concerns. To the extent that the United States' economic woes are salient (i.e., money is scarce) people should be less inclined to provide aid, especially if perceptions of personal responsibility for needing help are high.

Two samples of subjects were asked to indicate a dollar amount of aid they believed should be provided by the United States to help rebuild Iraq and Kuwait once hostilities ceased. One sample was collected the morning after the start of the ground war, and the

other sample was collected the morning after the cease-fire was announced. Our hypotheses were as follows:

(1) Iraq is expected to receive proportionally lower amounts of aid than Kuwait. However, timing of data collection may affect subjects' generosity. The widespread devastation of Iraq and Kuwait was becoming increasingly apparent to the American public as the ground war progressed. We expected that more assistance would be allocated to both Iraq and Kuwait in the second sample (collected after a cease-fire was announced) than the first sample (collected the day after the ground war was initiated).

(2) Attributions of responsibility for the war will be mentioned more than other factors when explaining aid allocations. In particular, we expect that high levels of responsibility for the war will be assigned to Iraq (internal-controllable attributions), whereas Kuwait will be attributed low responsibility for the war (they will be perceived as the victim of external circumstances, i.e. Iraqi aggression). These kinds of attribution statements should be mentioned more in open-ended explanations of aid allocations than other kinds of variables.

(3) Subjects who mention Iraqi responsibility for the war as an explanation for aid allocations should provide less aid to Iraq, and more aid to Kuwait, than those who do not.

(4) The United States economic outlook will influence people's willingness to provide foreign aid to Kuwait and Iraq. Making salient the economic recession (i.e. economic scarcity) and other economic woes should lessen people's willingness to aid either Kuwait or Iraq, as compared to conditions where emphasis is placed on predictions of a quick turn-around of the recession and an economic upswing. Skitka and Tetlock's contingency model would seem to suggest that scarcity should especially affect subjects' willingness to help personally responsible claimants, i.e. Iraq.

(5) Political ideology is also expected to influence willingness to provide aid as well as attributional and affective reactions. Specifically, conservatives have been found to be more punitive to people personally responsible for their predicament, and these reactions have been

found to be mediated by strong affective arousal. Political conservatives are expected to (a) hold Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi people more responsible for the war; (b) experience greater negative and less positive affect towards the citizens of Iraq and (c) provide less aid to Iraq.

Method

Subjects

Data were collected at two different junctures of the Persian Gulf conflict: Sample 1 (N=93) was collected on February 26 and 28, 1991—within 48 hours after the start of the ground war in the Persian Gulf¹. Sample 2 (N= 57) was collected the morning after the cease-fire was announced, April 30, 1991. Subjects in introductory or social psychology classes completed questionnaires in return for class credit. None of the subjects participating in the study on April 30 had participated in the study earlier.

Design

Background information was provided to subjects based on a 2 (U.S. economic outlook: optimistic or pessimistic) X 2 (Saddam Hussein: no mention or out-of-power) design.

Procedure

After assuring complete confidentiality of materials, subjects completed questionnaires as a group after being presented with background information. For example, the pessimistic economic outlook message was as follows:

We are interested in people's perceptions of the obligations of the United States at the end of the Persian Gulf conflict. The Persian Gulf situation presents some interesting problems for the United States. This is the first war that has coincided with a severe economic recession. It is clear that the United States is experiencing an enormous economic set back because of, for example, the Savings and Loan bail-out crisis and the huge budget deficit.

The United States has traditionally provided support after war to help repair and rebuild devastated countries. We provided financial support, for example, to Japan, Germany, and most of Europe after World War II, as well as to South Korea after the Korean conflict. *When deciding how much to give, assume Saddam Hussein is no longer in power.*

The optimistic economic outlook message removed the term "severe" and references to the Savings and Loan bail-out and budget deficit, and said instead that "economic indicators all point to a rapid end to the recession, and an enormous economic upswing by as early as this spring" as well as "economic indicators suggest we will be able to afford to provide assistance to both Iraq and Kuwait". Half the subjects did not receive the italicized phrase asking subjects to assume that Hussein would be out-of-power at the end of the conflict².

Subjects were then presented with an estimate of the total cost of rebuilding both Iraq (\$80 billion) and Kuwait (\$40 billion); both numbers being used by the popular press at the time. Subjects were then asked to indicate how much money they felt the United States should provide, and in an open-ended response format, to indicate why they chose this amount. Subjects then completed a number of 7-point rating scales indicating their degree of sympathy, anger, pity for the citizens of (separately) Iraq and Kuwait, as well as their perception of responsibility for

¹ No significant differences were found between the samples collected on February 26 and 28 with respect to any of our dependent measures, so we treated these groups as a single sample.

² We also included a need manipulation: Half the subjects read descriptions that emphasized that both Iraq and Kuwait would need substantial assistance due to estimated damage to their infrastructure (e.g. roads, bridges, and water supplies), whereas the other half of the subjects did not read these descriptions. However, manipulation checks indicated the need manipulation did not affect subjects' perceptions of the neediness of Iraq and Kuwait for post-war assistance.

the war on the part of Iraq, Kuwait, the U.S., President Bush and Saddam Hussein. Subjects participating in the second sample were also asked if their sense of patriotism had increased since the beginning of the Gulf War, and how bad they felt about the loss of lives in the war. Finally, subjects completed a measure of their political beliefs and attitudes, described in more detail below.

Measures

Ideology. Several measures of political ideology, beliefs and attitudes were used in the present study, including: Altemeyer's (1988) Right-Wing-Authoritarianism scale; a scale assessing proportional and egalitarian value orientations as they relate to public policy (Rasinski, 1987); Katz and Hass's (1988) humanism scale, and a single, bipolar, 10 point measure of liberal-conservatism. Principle components analysis (with varimax rotation³) created the subscales to be used in the study. Items loading .40 or greater on components with eigenvalues greater than 1 were retained for the factors, yielding a two-component solution: (1) *Liberalism*. Component 1 consisted of high egalitarian-humanism (e.g., "Those who are unable to provide for their basic needs should be helped by others" and "There should be equality for everyone—because we are all human beings"), and low endorsement of proportional values (e.g., "Anybody receiving welfare in this country should be made to work for the money they get" and "All things considered, most people get just what they deserve out of life"). In essence, this component represented a continuum of preference of egalitarian (liberal) versus individualistic (conservative) public policy and value orientations; (2) *Right-Wing-Authoritarianism (RWA)*: Component 2 consisted of high scores on Altemeyer's Right-Wing-Authoritarianism scale and high (conservative) scores on the self-report political ideology item.

³ Using an oblimin rotation yielded the same component solution and rank-order of variable loadings within components.

Component scores were calculated using the regression method.

Attributions of responsibility and affective reactions to Iraq and Kuwait. Self-reports of affective reactions towards (e.g. sympathy, anger) and attributions of responsibility on the part of the Iraqi and Kuwaiti citizenry, government, and leaders were analyzed by a principal components analysis with a varimax rotation that converged in 5 iterations. Three internally cohesive and well-defined components emerged (see Table 1). The first component (Sympathy for Kuwaiti citizens) included high sympathy and pity, and low anger, for Kuwaiti citizens, as well as a strong perception of Iraqi responsibility for the war and Kuwaiti victimization. The second component (Sympathy for Iraqi citizenry) included high sympathy and pity, and low anger, affective reactions towards the Iraqi citizenry. The third factor (U.S. Responsibility) represents the belief that President Bush and the United States government were responsible for the war.

Table 1 Principle components loading of responsibility and affect ratings

| | Component | | |
|--|------------------------------------|---------------|--------------------------|
| | 1 Iraq Responsible for Iraqi | 2 Sympathy | 3 U.S. Responsible |
| Eigenvalue | 3.37 | 2.22 | 1.62 |
| Sympathy for Kuwaiti citizens | .82 | | |
| Anger towards Kuwaiti citizens | -.77 | | |
| Pity for Kuwaiti citizens | .70 | | |
| Hussein responsible for war | .69 | | |
| Iraqi government responsible for war | .66 | | |
| Kuwaiti govt responsible for war | -.62 | | |
| Sympathy for Iraqi citizens | | .86 | |
| Anger towards Iraqi citizens | | -.83 | |
| Pity for Iraqi citizens | | .81 | |
| President Bush responsible for war | | | .94 |
| United States government responsible for war | | | .93 |

NOTE: A three-component solution was retained, all eigenvalues > 1.

Results

Scarcity manipulation check. Subjects in the scarcity condition (pessimistic economic forecast) perceived the U. S. economy to be less healthy ($M = 2.78$) than those in the no scarcity (optimistic economic forecast) condition ($M = 3.68$), $t(147) = 4.50$, $p < .001$, indicating that the scarcity manipulation created the intended perceptual effect.

Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 anticipated that Iraq would receive a proportionally lower amount of aid than Kuwait, but that allocations might be more generous as the war progressed. Examination of the time of data collection X country (Iraq or Kuwait) mixed ANOVA with the dependent variable of proportion of assistance allocated out of the total needed yielded a non-significant interaction [$F(1, 139) = 0.14$, *ns*] but significant main effects for both timing and country. Allocations near the end of the war were considerably more generous ($M = 38.2\%$ of requested) than allocations made at the beginning of the ground war, ($M = 26.6\%$), $F(1, 139) = 3.31$, $p < .05$. And as expected, Iraq received proportionally less assistance ($M = 22.1\%$) than Kuwait ($M = 39.5\%$), $F(1, 139) = 57.02$, $p < .001$.

Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 examines to what extent subjects spontaneously mentioned attributional factors as reasons for why they provided the amount of assistance they did to Iraq and Kuwait, and then how cited reasons corresponded to the proportion of aid given. Consistent with hypotheses, attributions of responsibility were salient determinants of aid allocations to especially Iraq, but also to Kuwait.

Coding of open-ended responses was developed on the basis of examination of actual subject responses in the first sample. Subjects' responses were examined, and each time a novel reason emerged, a new coding category was developed. Using this method, 16 categories of reasons were developed. Two independent judges then coded all questionnaires, and percent agreement reached 98%. Differences were discussed and resolved to consensus.

In order to facilitate analysis, categories with an observed frequency of less than 5 were collapsed into an "other" category. This yielded 7 codeable categories of reasons provided for aid allocations to Iraq, and 8 for aid allocations for Kuwait. Table 2 summarizes the distribution of reasons people gave for their allocations.

Table 2. Percentage of subjects who provided each kind of justification for aid allocations to Iraq and Kuwait.

| Justification | Kuwait | Iraq |
|--|--------|------|
| Iraqi responsibility for the war | | 36.2 |
| Victims of aggression | 12.7 | |
| Coalition should share the cost | 18.0 | 20.0 |
| U.S. not obligated to or should not help | 9.3 | 13.3 |
| U.S. should help, but limited in ability | 13.3 | 6.7 |
| Iraqi citizens not at fault for war | | 6.0 |
| Humanitarian aid only | 6.0 | 4.0 |
| Can afford to take care of rebuilding themselves | 12.0 | 3.3 |
| In exchange for oil, or American jobs | 8.7 | |
| Iraq should pay war reparations | 3.3 | |
| U.S. helped enough by fighting war | 10.7 | |
| Other | 4.7 | 10.5 |

NOTE: A lone decimal point (.) indicates the coding category was not used when explaining aid allocation to that country.

Iraq. Consistent with hypotheses, attributions regarding Iraqi responsibility for the war was the most frequently cited explanation for the amount of aid given to Iraq and was used by 36% of the subjects. Other widely used explanations included that the coalition should share the costs of providing post-war assistance (19.44%); that the U.S. had no obligation to help Iraq (13.19%); and that the U.S. couldn't afford to help (6.9%).

Kuwait. Attributions of external causes (specifically, that Kuwaiti citizens were victims of aggression) constituted 12.75% of the reasons cited for allocations to Kuwait. However, more subjects mentioned that the coalition should share the costs of rebuilding Kuwait (18.12%) than external attributions. Other frequently used explanations included the fact that the Kuwaiti's did not really need U.S.

Table 3. Correlates of aid allocations to Iraq and Kuwait

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) |
|--|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|------------------|--------------------|------|--------------------|------------------|------|------|------|------|
| 1 Proportion of aid provided to Iraq | 1.00 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2 Proportion of aid provided to Kuwait | .60 ^{**} | 1.00 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 3 Egalitarian-humanism | .30 ^{**} | .15 [*] | 1.00 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4 Right-Wing-Authoritarianism | -.08 | -.02 | .00 | 1.00 | | | | | | | | | |
| 5 Sympathy for Kuwaiti citizens | -.13 | .01 | .11 | .22 ^{**} | 1.00 | | | | | | | | |
| 6 Iraqi responsibility for war | -.33 ^{**} | -.01 | -.34 ^{**} | -.03 | .14 [*] | 1.00 | | | | | | | |
| 7 Sympathy for Iraqi citizens | .22 ^{**} | .03 | .20 ^{**} | -.11 | -.01 | -.29 ^{**} | 1.00 | | | | | | |
| 8 U.S./Bush responsible for war | .11 | -.04 | .09 | -.22 ^{**} | .00 | -.04 | .01 | 1.00 | | | | | |
| 9 Scarcity (economic forecast) | .21 ^{**} | .23 ^{**} | -.03 | .01 | -.02 | -.05 | .03 | -.20 ^{**} | 1.00 | | | | |
| 10 Hussein assumed out of power | .15 [*] | .03 | .13 [*] | .04 | -.08 | -.18 [*] | .08 | .06 | .01 | 1.00 | | | |
| 11 Timing of data collection | .21 ^{**} | .18 [*] | .00 | -.02 | -.04 | .09 | .00 | -.10 | .01 | .00 | 1.00 | | |
| 12 Increased patriotism since beginning of the Gulf War [†] | .13 | -.06 | -.25 ^{**} | .14 | .08 | .02 | -.05 | .01 | .14 | .15 | — | 1.00 | |
| 13 Feel bad about loss of lives in the Gulf War [†] | .23 ^{**} | .28 [*] | .24 [*] | -.35 ^{**} | -.19 | .11 | .06 | -.36 ^{**} | .29 [*] | .12 | — | .07 | 1.00 |

[†] These questions were only asked of the second sample; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

NOTE: Iraq responsibility for the war was coded 0 = other justification provided for aid allocation to Iraq, 1 = Iraqi responsibility/blame provided as justification for aid allocation to Iraq; Scarcity was coded 0 = pessimistic economic forecast, 1 = optimistic economic forecast; Timing of data collection was coded 0 = beginning of ground war, 1 = cease fire announced.

assistance (they could help themselves: 12.0%); and that the U.S. should help, but has limited abilities to do so (13.30%). Interestingly, only 6.7% thought Iraq should pay war reparations to Kuwait.

Table 3 presents results relating to hypotheses 3 through 5. Hypothesis 3 suggested that perceived Iraqi responsibility for the war would lead to lower amounts of post-war allocation to Iraq. In support of this hypothesis, the point-biserial correlation between whether attributions of responsibility were mentioned as the reason for the amount of aid given with the amount of aid provided to Iraq was significant, $r = -.30$, $p < .001$. Subjects who made open-ended attributions of Iraqi responsibility provided less aid ($M = 8.7$ billion dollars) than those who did not ($M = 20.25$ billion dollars). Of those subjects who gave Iraqi responsibility as the justification for their aid allocations, 63%

provided no assistance to Iraq, as compared to 23% of those who provided some other justification for their aid allocation. None of the subjects who cited Iraqi responsibility as their justification for providing aid to Iraq provided more than half of the amount needed to re-build Iraq after the end of the war, as compared 37% of those who provided some other justification.

Hypothesis 4 suggested that the United States' economic outlook would influence people's willingness to provide foreign aid to Kuwait and Iraq. As can be seen in Table 3, the point-biserial correlations between scarcity and post-war aid to Iraq and Kuwait were both significant. More aid was provided to both Iraq and Kuwait by subjects exposed to an optimistic economic forecast than by subjects exposed to a pessimistic economic forecast.

Hypothesis 5 suggested political attitudes and beliefs would correlate with perceptions of responsibility, affective

reactions towards the citizens of Iraq and Kuwait, and allocations of aid. As can be seen in Table 3 and consistent with hypotheses, high right-wing-authoritarianism (RWA) was associated with higher sympathy for the Kuwaitis and stronger perceptions of Iraqi responsibility for the war. RWA was also negatively related with the belief that President Bush or the United States government were responsible for the war or bad feelings over the loss of lives. The correlational evidence indicates that the effects of RWA on aid allocations to Iraq were mediated by sympathetic reactions towards the Kuwaitis. People high in RWA felt more sympathy for the Kuwaitis, and therefore were less likely to provide aid to Iraq. Path analysis confirmed this interpretation.

High liberalism, on the other hand, was related with (a) more aid to both Iraq and Kuwait, (b) a lower likelihood of attributing Iraqi responsibility for the war in open-ended explanations of aid allocations, (c) decreased patriotism as a result of the war, (d) more sympathy for the Iraqi citizenry, and (e) more bad feelings over loss of life than conservatives, all results consistent with hypotheses.

In further support for Hypothesis 5, analysis of the responsibility for the war (5: Iraqi, Kuwaiti, or U.S. government; Saddam Hussein or President Bush) X liberalism (2: sample median split, high, low) X right-wing-authoritarianism (RWA: 2: sample median split, high, low) X timing (2) mixed ANOVA revealed significant effects for the RWA X responsibility interaction, $F(4, 556) = 4.64, p < .001$, and the main effect of responsibility, $F(4, 556) = 131.54, p < .001$. Tukey tests indicated that the Iraqi government ($M = 6.01$) and Saddam Hussein ($M = 6.56$) were seen as equally responsible for the war, and more responsible than President Bush ($M = 3.78$), the U.S. government ($M = 3.74$), or the Kuwaiti government ($M = 3.14$).

Analysis of simple main effects indicated that, whereas there were no differences as a function of RWA for perceptions of Iraqi, Kuwaiti or Saddam Hussein's responsibility for the war, low RWAs believed that both the U.S. government ($M = 4.10$)

and President Bush ($M = 4.20$) were more responsible for the war than high RWAs ($M = 3.36, 3.34$, respectively).

In order to gain further insight into what best predicts allocations of aid, stepwise multiple regression analyses were used to predict the amount of aid given to Iraq and Kuwait. Consistent with earlier hypotheses, it was anticipated that responsibility, scarcity, and political attitudes should explain the most variance in aid allocations to Iraq. Responsibility should be less salient in allocations to Kuwait, but scarcity and political attitudes should continue to be important variables.

Table 4 presents the results of the regression analysis entering liberalism, right-wing-authoritarianism, sympathy for Kuwaiti citizens, Iraqi responsibility for the war, sympathy for Iraqi citizens, U.S. responsibility for the war, scarcity, Hussein assumed in or out of power, and timing of data collection in a stepwise fashion to predict aid to Iraq. Consistent with hypotheses, Iraqi responsibility for the war entered the equation first, explaining 11% of the variance in aid to Iraq. Liberalism and scarcity explained an additional 4% respectively. Timing added 3% more explained variance, yielding a total $R^2 = .23, F(4, 137) = 10.04, p < .001$. RWA, however, explained no variance in aid allocations even when forced first into the equation. As discussed earlier, the effects of RWA on aid to Iraq were mediated by sympathy aroused in response to the Kuwaiti citizens.

Table 4. Stepwise regression results predicting aid to Iraq

| Variable | R^2 Change | F | p |
|---|--------------|-------|-------|
| Iraq responsible for the war (open-ended) | .11 | 17.64 | <.001 |
| Liberalism | .04 | 6.57 | .011 |
| Scarcity | .04 | 7.09 | .008 |
| Timing | .03 | 5.87 | .017 |
| Total R^2 | .23 | | |

Table 5 presents the results of the regression analysis entering the same set of variables to predict aid allocated to Kuwait. Scarcity entered the equation first, explaining 5% of the variance, and timing explained an additional 3%,

for a total $R^2 = .08$, $F(2, 139) = 6.58$, $p < .01$. Ideological variables did not explain any significant variance in allocations to Kuwait once these variables were in the equation. These results are consistent with earlier research indicating stronger effects for ideology in response to internal-controllable claimants than claimants with other causes of need (Skitka & Tetlock, 1991).

Table 5. Stepwise regression results predicting aid to Kuwait

| Variable | R^2 Change | F | p |
|----------|--------------|------|------|
| Scarcity | .05 | 8.01 | .005 |
| Timing | .03 | 4.93 | .028 |
| Total | .08 | | |

Discussion

This study made use of the advent of the Persian Gulf War to investigate the roles of ideology, perceived responsibility, affect, and distributive values in predicting people's willingness to provide post-war assistance to Iraq and Kuwait. Consistent with considerable research in other domains, perceived responsibility was associated with less assistance. Moreover, perceived responsibility for the war was cited most frequently as the justification for the amount of postwar aid provided to Iraq in open-ended explanations for aid allocations. The clear majority of those who cited responsibility as justification for their aid allocations provided no assistance at all to Iraq.

Scarcity of resources, in the form of a pessimistic economic forecast, also affected people's willingness to provide post-war assistance. Those subjects who were exposed to the pessimistic economic forecast provided less assistance to both Iraq and Kuwait than those exposed to an optimistic economic forecast. It was predicted that the scarcity manipulation would more strongly affect willingness to help Iraq than Kuwait. This hypothesis was not supported in the present data. The data indicated that despite the fact

that Kuwait was not perceived as responsible for its predicament, feelings of responsibility to help even Kuwait were relatively weak (very few people allocated the total assistance Kuwait required). Results indicated this finding was due to two factors: (1) the perceived shared responsibility to help Kuwait on the part of coalition members (diffusion of responsibility, cf. Darley & Latané, 1968), and (2) the perceived ability of Kuwait to help itself, or lack of legitimate need (cf. Berkowitz, 1969).

Political ideology also influenced people's willingness to provide assistance to Iraq and Kuwait. Liberals provided more assistance to Iraq than conservatives, a result due in part to the fact that liberals held the Iraqi people and leaders less responsible for the war, felt more sympathy for the Iraqi public, and felt worse about the loss of life in the war than conservatives. These results are consistent with other research indicating that liberals are less likely to react punitively towards people personally responsible for their plight than conservatives (Skitka & Tetlock, 1991).

The results of this study provide further support for a growing body of research that indicates that people are least likely to help others who are personally responsible for needing help (e.g. Weiner, Perry & Magnusson, 1988). Taken together, the results of this study provide further support for the contingency model proposed by Skitka and Tetlock (1991). In contrast to hypotheses that could be generated from other theories of distributive justice (e.g. Deutsch, 1985), distributive standards such as need, equality, equity or efficiency were not mentioned by subjects in open-ended explanations for their allocations. Instead, concerns like locus of responsibility on the part of Iraq and Kuwait, and the ability of the United States to help, were more reliably provided by subjects as the underlying factors influencing their allocation decisions.

Whereas people's reactions to the prospect of helping either Iraq or Kuwait are shaped by many factors, the results of this study indicate the utility of Skitka and Tetlock's (1991) contingency model of allocation preferences in explaining allocations even in this politically charged arena. Research investigating hypotheses generated by the model indicate that allocation decisions are not shaped by distributive principles such as equity, need or

equality alone, but also by the integration of situational constraints, attributions of responsibility, and the ideological orientation of the allocator.

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